prosecutor by attaching limitations upon the use of evidence which he might acquire. It has been suggested that active participation by the prosecutor in the apprehension of the accused may have an adverse effect upon both the weight and admissibility of evidence gathered during his investigations, regarding which the prosecutor is required to be a witness.
2 ' This is particularly true when the use of materials gathered by investigation require that he be a witness at the trial itself. The policy of some courts in refusing to permit the prosecuting attorney to prosecute and testify at the same trial is based upon a fear that the self interest of the prosecutor, as a witness, will unduly prejudice the jury against the accused.22 It is considered probable that the prosecutor's testimony against the accused would be stronger and more effective than that of any defense witness in the eyes of the jury. By actively participating, therefore, in preindictment investigations, the prosecutor may risk his eligibility to try the case. However, if the circumstances of the case make his testimony essential, he can withdraw and allow other counsel to prosecute, since in many communities there is more than one attorney in the prosecutor's office.u Therefore, the risk of disqualification may not in certain cases deter the prosecuting attorney from investigating. In addition, in many metropolitan areas detectives and police officers attached to the prosecutor's office render it unnecessary for him to conduct investigations personally 2 4 Despite the absence of legislation or judicial authority requiring him to investigate, the prosecutor nevertheless probably has power to undertake any of the three possible types of investigation, 25 as an implied corollary to his duty to 21 In Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593 (1947) , the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, although it was lawful for the prosecuting attorney to accompany the sheriff during a raid on the premises of an alleged liquor license violator, if he chose to prosecute the case, he should not be allowed to testify over objection by the accused.
2 In May v. Commonwealth, 285 S. W. 2d 160 (Ky. 1955) , where the defendant was indicted for assaulting the prosecuting attorney, the latter was both prosecutor and the chief witness for the state at the defendant's trial. The court held that in order to remove the element of self-interest another attorney should have tried the action.
2 In Bennett v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 333, 28 S.W. 2d 24 (1930) , where the prosecuting attorney was held incompetent to testify as to violations he had observed during a police investigation, the court suggested that his testimony could be heard if he withdrew from prosecuting the case.
2 See note 2, supra, and note 30, infra.
25 See text at note 7, suPra.
prosecute. Since in most instances there is no legal prohibition against the prosecutor's authority to investigate, it is important to ascertain how the prosecuting attorney should investigate in order to effectively combat organized crime.
TEE PROPER METnOD OF INVESTIGATION
The needs and duties of the rural prosecutor differ from those of the metropolitan official. For this reason a uniform investigative procedure would not be sufficiently flexible to satisfy the requisites of both.
The Rural Prosecutor. In the less populous county, the sheriff or the constable is supposed to be the chief law enforcement officer.H However, in some rural areas, where these officers are not trained in the technique of modern police investigation, the prosecutor may be the only public official qualified to conduct important investigations. In such communities, therefore, the prosecutor, as a practical matter, must take a more active role in criminal investigation than the prosecutor in a larger community.
2 8 Although in rural counties organized crime is of lesser proportions than in metropolitan areas, criminal elements are quick to take advantage of lax or corruptible local officials. 29 Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the rural county prosecuting attorney to exercise vigilance both in insuring that the local sheriff or constable performs his job efficiently and in personally undertaking criminal investigations for which those officials are not qualified.
The Urban Prosecutor. In the more populous counties where police, sheriff, and coroner have adequate investigatory staffs, the prosecuting attorney should investigate only to insure that these officials act honestly. There are several considerations which render it inadvisable for the metropolitan prosecutor to engage in unlimited 26 See, e.g., SmTh, POLICE SvsTinrs IN THE UNiTED STATES, 83-106 (2d. ed. 1949) . " See, e.g., I ORGANIZED Cla, AND LAW ENFORCEmENT 252 (1952) . 21 However, one might question whether the scientific methods which must be mastered for an effective homicide investigation, are equally as essential to detect such obvious violations as gambling and prostitution. If not, there seemingly would be no basis for concluding that the rural county prosecutor should have more investigative powers than the urban prosecuting attorney.
2 See, e.g., Senate Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime In Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report, S. RP: No. 307 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 61-63 (1951) . where there is a discussion of the problems of organized crime in a few of the smaller counties of Illinois. 408 (1956) . See also, State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 190, 96 A. 2d 63, 83 (1953) 2 "In metropolitan communities like Cook County, Illinois, Los Angeles County, California, or Bergen County, New Jersey, there is a congery of independent local police forces covering the county.... There is no centralized direction or control and no centralized responsibility that a single uniform law-enforcement policy is applied over the entire geographic area of a county. The situation lends itself to 'buck passing' and evasion of responsibility which can only inure to the benefit of gangsters and racketeers." Senate Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1951) . The situation Senator Kefauver found in Reading, Pennsylvania, is an eximple of "buck passing" by the local authorities. In Reading, Pa., the prosecuting attorney told the Kefauver Committee that he thought gambling was the responsibility of the chief of police, who said he only acted on order from the mayor. Whereas, the Mayor said it was up to the clergy to rid the people of the urge to gamble. "Therefore, in Reading, with a $5,000,000.00 annual take from gambling, the enforcement of the law is in the hands of God." Patterson, The Scandal of our District Attorneys, This Week Magazine, Jan. 23, 1952, p. 5. 3 It is not suggested that the prosecuting attorney should personally seek out dishonest public officials until he has received information indicating a need for investigation. mation, refuse to investigate or repeatedly make unlawful raids, thus indicating collusion with the gambling operators, the prosecutor may be able to use this misconduct as evidence to convict the responsible police officials.
CRIINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
3 4 However, if there is reason to suspect that the police make a lawful raid but only after warning the criminals that a raid is imminent, the proseLutor should investigate in order to establish proof of this misconduct. 3 In order to procure evidence for prosecution in this type of case, the prosecuting attorney must resort to effective investigative techniques, such as stationing an undercover agent in the gambling establishment which the police, through sham raids made after a prior warning, have permitted to remain in operation. 6 Although this evidence could be used against the operators of the unlawful enterprise, the prosecutor's investigation should have as its primary goal the conviction of the responsible local official who has failed to perform his job properly. The conviction of but one police official would perhaps serve as an effective deterrent t6 further laxity or corruptness on the part of other law enforcers. Such a result would be more effective in combatting organized crime than any attempted duplication of local police work." 3 1 In order for a raid to be lawful it must be conducted with a valid search warrant so that any materials gathered during such raid may be used as evidence against the offenders. See, e.g., Comment, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 7 SRAcusE L. REv. 319 (1956) . 35 The problem of convicting the local police officer for wilful neglect of duty and incompetence is dealt with in a succeeding section of this symposium.
3 16 In order to trap the police officer who is warning the gambling house before the raid, the prosecutor should once again inform the officer of the gambling operation. The prosecutor should then record the precise time at which he informed the police agency of the violation. At the same time the undercover agent stationed in the gambling house could note the exact time when the proprietor orders it cleared and the gambling equipment removed. Evidence obtained by these means would enable the prosecutor to prove the existence of a conspiracy between the particular police officer and the criminal offenders.
37 A related problem concerns the role which the civic crime commissions, that is, private groups organized to check the police, should play in aiding the prosecutor to convict law enforcement officers linked with organized crime. Most crime commissions refuse to investigate to gather evidence for prosecution. These organizations keep the activities of syndicate crime on file and make regular reports on instances of criminal violations to the prosecutor and police authorities. However, the commissions insist that it is the function of the police to gather evidence. Also, by revealing the identity of their undercover agents in order to aid in the prosecution of criminal offenders, these agents would lose all future value as investigators for the commission -thus, entailing a great loss of man power and money 
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE GRAND JURY AS AN INVESTIGATIVE BODY
The policy of limited investigation should not prohibit the prosecuting attorney from investigating in a general manner when directed to do so by the grand jury. The grand jury, through its common law and statutory powers, has broad powers to investigate criminal activities.Y State courts generally have held that the prosecutor must co-operate with the grand jury in its investigations. 39 For this reason it has been argued that perhaps the prosecutor should only investigate in conjunction with the grand jury. However, it is usually difficult to convene the grand jury, and once convened it is limited in tenure. 40 As a result, grand jury investigations of organized crime have been rare.4 Thus, the prosecutor, acting solely as an investigator under the auspices of the grand jury, cannot be expected to contribute a great deal to the suppression of organized crime. For this reason, the prosecutor should not rely upon an order from the grand jury before commencing investigation, but rather should take immediate action against those officials responsible for the unlawful situation.
CONCLUSION
The prosecutor, through exercise of the investigative powers of his office, should effectively check which go into training of a competent agent. For a thorough discussion of the operations of a civic crime commission, see Petersen, How To Form A Citizens Crime Commission, 17 FED. PkoB. 9 (1953) .
13 For a discussion of the grand jury's investigatory powers, see Comments, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 194 (1956) ; 37 MINN. L. RPv. 586 (1953) .
S9 See, e.g., State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1940) where the prosecutor was obliged by the court to co-operate with the grand jury.
40 See note 38, supra. Perhaps, this infrequent use may be attributed to the prosecutor's failure to request that it be convened.
41 See note 38, supra.
the growth and continuance of organized criminal activities. However, to make the most advantageous use of his office, the prosecuting attorney should investigate organized crime only to supplement or keep check on those agencies which are primarily responsible for law enforcement and should not duplicate efforts of local police authorities, or work in competition with them.
In metropolitan areas, there are strong pressures which may motivate the prosecuting attorney to pursue a policy of promiscuous investigation. These pressures may take the form of a crusading, circulation-conscious press, which .has taken a vehement stand against unchecked organized crime. Since the prosecutor's office by tradition serves as an initial step toward more ambitious political undertakings, it is understandable that the prosecuting attorney should desire to maintain the best possible relations with the metropolitan newspapers and the public. The characteristic publicity of the office may assure the prosecutor of a bright political future. Thus, for some prosecuting attorneys the desire for the publicity of sensational investigation may overshadow any inclination to pursue a wiser policy of limited and more fruitful investigation.
Perhaps the solution to the urban prosecutor's dilemma lies in the enactment of a statute requiring him to investigate, *but limiting his duties to the procurement of evidence for prosecution of corrupt or lax law enforcers, and to the gathering of evidence after indictment for the purpose of prosecuting accused criminals. This statute should also provide for the prosecutor to investigate if ordered to do so by the grand jury or the attorney general.4 2 The problem of the local prosecuting attorney's relationship with the state attorney general is examined in a succeeding section of this symposium. In certain situations the attorney general should have the authority to avail himself of the investigative facilities and services of the local prosecutor.
LEGAL METHODS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
I. Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor
LOUIS SUNDERLAND
The elimination of organized crime is basically a problem of the enforcement of state laws. 'While the governor is charged with executing the law and the attorney general is the state's chief legal officer, the prosecution of state law violations is primarily conducted by local prosecuting attorneys. When the local prosecutor fails to perform his duty other methods of law enforcement must be found. Two of the more frequently suggested methods are prosecution by the state attorney general or by a special prosecutor appointed by a court.
THE ATTOR.NEY GENERALS' POWER TO PROSECUTE
The attorney generals' authority to conduct criminal prosecutions varies among the states. In two states he is the sole prosecutor.' In contrast, the attorney general of Texas appears to have no criminal jurisdiction other than to represent the state on appeal.
2 Between these two extremes fall many degrees of power to prosecute. 3 However, the infrequent exercise of the attorney generals' power to participate in criminal actions has created some doubt as to the existence or adequacy of that power. A determination of the existence and extent of the attorney generals' power to prosecute requires an examination of the sources of that power. These sources vary among the states. For instance, one state will find such authority in the common law, another will establish it by statute and a third by a constitutional provision.
Common Law Powers
The office of attorney general evolved in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 4 Prior to this time the Crown was represented by a number of attorneys with limited authority as to the actions which they could initiate and the I Only in Delaware and Rhode Island are prosecutions carried on by someone other than locally elected prosecuting attorneys. In these two states the attorney general conducts all prosecutions through his appointed deputies. DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §2501-08 (1953) courts in which they could appear. The attorney general gradually supplanted these attorneys until he became the chief legal officer of the Crown. Although the exact extent of his criminal jurisdiction is somewhat obscure, he undoubtedly had broad power to initiate criminal prosecutions. 5 An early American case assumed that the state attorney general possessed the broad powers of the English attorney general at common law. 0 Subsequently, a New York court listed the powers and duties of the state attorney general, basing its conclusions primarily upon the description in Blackstone's Commentaries of the powers of the English attorney general. 7 This list has been accepted as authoritative by most of those courts which have held that the common law powers of the English attorney general exist in their state attorney general.
8 Although this list has been relied upon as authority for the position that the attorney general has the power to prosecute all criminal cases, the language used by the New York court suggested 'that the common law power had some undefined limitations.
9
Of all the states, Pennsylvania has recognized the most extensive common law powers in the attorney general to conduct criminal prosecutions. That official, who is appointed by the governor, has been held to have the discretionary power to supersede the prosecuting attorney, who is an elected official. The power to supersede enables the attorney general to replace the local prosecutor and conduct the proceedings from the investigation stage through the trial. However, it has been held that the Pennsylvania attorney general may not act arbitrarily, since the exercise of his discretion is subject to judicial review. cutions. Usually, they have indicated that the attorney general possesses all common law powers except those removed by statute.
When the attorney general's powers and duties are defined as "those prescribed by law," the courts have construed the word "law" to include the common law. By adopting this construction, courts incorporate the common law powers and duties of the attorney general into the general statutory or constitutional provision establishing the modem office 1 3
With the exception of Illinois, those states which recognize the common law powers indicate .that these powers can be limited by statute' 4 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has held that, while the legislature may charge the attorney general with new powers and duties, it cannot strip him of any of the common law powers and duties incident to the office. 5 The court reasoned that since the common law powers and duties of the attorney general were, by implication, incorporated into that office through a provision of the state constitution, such powers and duties can be divested only by constitutional amendment. The Illinois attorney general, therefore, appears to have broad power to prosecute criminal cases. However, such power has been used sparingly. 6 Furthermore, the language of a recent case has cast some doubt upon the existence of the attorney general's criminal jurisdiction. 7 In an attempt to (all powers at common law); clarify this matter, the state legislature recently considered and rejected a bill authorizing the attorney general, at the request of the governor, to conduct criminal prosecutions in any county. 8 Despite the many cases and treatises recognizing some common law powers in the modern attorney general, a substantial minority of states deny their attorney general all common law powers. 19 These powers are usually rejected on the grounds that the state official possesses only delegated rather than implied powers. Thus, the official holds only those powers specifically granted to him by the state constitution or by statutes. In addition, Indiana has held that since the office was created by statute, its powers can only be granted by statute .
2
The New Mexico Supreme Court, adopting a different approach, has rejected the common law powers on the grounds that the office of attorney general of New Mexico was created prior to that state's adoption of the common law.2 1 Since the common law was not in effect when the office was established, the court reasoned that its creators could not have intended that the common law powers and duties be implied as an incident to that office.
(1941). In this case, an indictment obtained by the attorney general was quashed. Although quashed upon other grounds, the court said that the statutes did not authorize the attorney general to take exclusive charge of prosecution. The court thus implied that the attorney general's authority was based upon statute rather than the common law.
IsILL. REv. STAT. c. 14, §4(4) (1955) authorizes the attorney general to attend any criminal trial "and assist in the prosecution" when the interest of the state so requires. Senate Bill 9 108, 69th G.A. (1955) would have replaced the above quoted words with, "and if the Governor requests the attorney general in writing the attorney general shall, in his discretion, have the right to conduct the prosecution including, but not limited to, any preliminary proceedings such as the presentation of evidence to or examination of witnesses before any Grand Jury, regular or special, of any county, with or without the acquiesience, assistance or presence of the state's attorney."
It has been argued in some states that common law powers do not reside in the attorney general at the present time because they are the product of a different political system." Under the English system the attorney general appointed the local prosecutors, while, in contrast, the present day local prosecutor is generally an elected official. Since the methods of selecting these officials differ, it has been argued that their powers and duties should also differ.
All states, whether rejecting or recognizing the existence of common law powers, have adopted statutes granting certain specific powers and duties to the attorney general. In some states the statutory powers have been interpreted as supplanting common law powers, while in others they have been held to supplement the existing common law powers."
Statutory Provisions
Supervision statutes. One of the powers assigned to the attorney general by statute is that of supervising local prosecutors.
2 4 Such statutes usually contain general language authorizing the attorney general to direct and control the prosecutor in all matters pertaining to his office. In addition to this general supervision, the attorney general is often specifically authorized by these statutes to intervene and direct the prosecutor's actions in a criminal proceeding. Attorney generals have conducted criminal prosecutions under the authority of such statutes;" 5 however, the powers to intervene 22 See, e.g., Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915) (dissenting opinion); Appeal of Margiotti, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950) 
(dissenting opinion).
2 See note 19 supra for states that have supplanted the common law powers by statute. See notes 11 and 12 supra for states that consider the statutory provisions as supplemental to the common law powers.
2"See ARiz. Rrv. STAT. §41-193(4) (West 1956 ), which is a typical supervising provision. The attorney general shall "exercise supervisory powers over county attorneys of the several counties in matters pertaining to that office and require reports relating to the public business thereof." See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §236 (1940) or initiate actions are exercisable at the discretion of the attorney general. The majority of "supervising" statutes thus appear to nfford the attorney general adequate powers to direct or conduct prosecutions if the prosecutor should be reluctant to act. However, some statutes which authorize the attorney general to supervise the state's general legal affairs specifically exempt the prosecutor from such supervision. Such a statute is valueless as a basis for the attorney general's circumvention of a corrupt prosecutor.
Supersession statides. Another frequently delegated statutory power is that of supersession of the prosecutor by the attorney general upon the request of the governor or the legislature.2Y Under the language of some statutes, even though requested, he can not be required to supersede. Moreover, he is sometimes authorized to exercise this supersession power at his discretion in the absence of any request. The language of these statutes indicates that the attorney general has the authority to replace the prosecutor in any 21 See, e.g., Com. GEM. STAT., §212 (1949) which provides, "the attorney general shall have general supervision over all legal matters in which the state is an interested party, except those legal matters over which prosecuting officers have direction." 2 See MicH. STAT. ANN. §3.181 (1952) , which is a typical supersession provision. "The attorney general shall also, when requested by the governor, or either branch of the legislature, and may, when in his own judgement the interests of the state require it, intervene in and appear for the people of this state in any other court or tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the people of this state may be a party or interested." See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, §235 action, whether at the investigatory or at the trial stage.
2 8 This power of supersession is combined with the supervising power in a number of states.
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However, the supersession power alone apparently affords the attorney general sufficient authority to prosecute if the local prosecutor refuses. Perhaps the essential difference between the "supervisory" and "supersession" statutes is that the former are primarily concerned with the prevention of misconduct by the prosecutor while the latter are concerned with correcting the results of such misconduct. However, the threat of supersession, as well as the supervisory power, may serve to prevent misconduct.
Cmcurrentjurisdiction. While under the common law and under some of the "supervising" statutes the attorney general apparently has concurrent jurisdiction-that is, the same powers as the local prosecutor-a few states expressly grant him concurrent jurisdiction by statute. 30 In contrast to most supervision and supersession statutes, the attorney general, under this type of statute apparently can not replace the prosecutor. However, he can initiate an action independently of the local prosecutor or appear jointly in the same proceeding with the local prosecutor.
A basic fault of concurrent jurisdiction is that it divides the responsibility for enforcing the law." For example, when both the attorney general and the prosecutor are actively participating in a case and both possess equal authority, there is a question as to which one is in charge of the prosecution.n An even more unfortunate situation is 28The attorney general is sometimes given the power to supersede for the purpose of enforcing a particular statute. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT §84-204 (1943) which is a typical concurrent jurisdiction provision. "The Attorney General and the Department of Justice shall have the same powers and prerogatives in each of the several counties of the state as the county attorneys have in their respective counties." See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. c. 20, §9 (1954) (1956) , where there appeared to be some disagreement between the attorney general and the prosecutor over the entry of a nolle prosequi. created when both officers initiate and prosecute the same offense simultaneously in different courts." Any such division of responsibility allows both officers to excuse their failure by blaming the other.
Assist and advise statutes. Perhaps the least significant of all statutory powers granted to the attorney general are those requiring or allowing him to assist, consult or advise the local prosecutor. 4 This assistance may take the form of actual attendance at the trial or the preparation of an advisory opinion. Usually these statutes provide for this assistance at the request of the prosecuting attorney. However, some of these statutes also authorize the attorney general to request the assistance of the prosecutor. They appear to have been designed to encourage cooperation and mutual assistance between the two officers. Since these statutes fail to give the attorney general much actual authority over the prosecutor, they are of little value when the prosecutor fails to perform.
Department of Justice.
A recent trend in legislation pertaining to the powers and duties of the attorney general has been the creation of "Departments of Justice" or "Departments of Law."
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3 See Dupree v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 369, 171 Pac. 489 (1918) , where the prosecutor conducted an action in the superior court and the attorney general in the district court. The case held that since the prosecutor's proceedings had resulted in a verdict of not guilty a plea of former jeopardy was a valid defense against the attorney general's action. 34 See ILL. REV. STAT. c. 14, §4(4) (1955), which is a typical assist and advise statute. "The duties of the attorney general shall be... to consult with and advise the several state's attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office; and when, in his judgement, the interest of the people of the state required it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution." See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-702 (1947) The purpose of such reorganizations of the attorney generals' offices is to centralize to some extent the law enforcement machinery of the state. Legislation to this effect usually does nothing more than change the name of the department without altering the duties and powers of the attorney general. Under this system the attorney general usually has the same authority as that granted by the "supervision" and "supersession" statutes. This department concept stems from either the United States Department of Justice or the English system of prosecution. 36 However, under the departmental system, in contrast to the federal or English systems, the local prosecutors remain elected officialsY The attorney general's control over a locally elected prosecutor will be substantially less than that over a prosecutor appointed by him. For this reason, statutes creating departments of justice or departments of law have generally resulted in little significant improvement in state law enforcement. But there is evidence that attorneys general operating under such statutes have been able to increase coordination among local law enforcement officials.3 a
Failure of Existing Powers
The local prosecutor has the primary duty to prosecute all violations of the law within his jurisdiction, even when the laws are looked upon with disfavor by local citizens. 39 Since he some- § §52. 17A-1 to -20 (1937) times shrinks from this primary duty, it is not surprising to find the attorney general avoiding what are at most vague secondary responsibilities in regard to criminal prosecution. Moreover, the attorney general is subject to pressures in addition to those which may make the prosecutor reluctant to act. These pressures are particularly effective since the attorney general's powers are exercisable at his discretion. Of course, if he exercises his discretion by participating in a criminal prosecution, his actions are subject to court review. On the other hand, the permissive language of the statutes may prevent the courts from reviewing the attorney general's failure to exercise his powers. Therefore, even when he has adequate power to circumvent the local prosecutor, he can not be required to exercise this power. Perhaps the foremost reason for the attorney general's reluctance to prosecute is that he is unaware of conditions in the local prosecutor's office. In order to effectively exercise his supervision and supersession powers he must know something about the particular activities of the prosecutor. A number of states have adopted a reporting system in an effort to keep the attorney general informed of the prosecutor's actions. 40 However, these reports only inform the attorney general of completed actions, such as the number of arrests, indictments and convictions. They do not inform the attorney general of conditions in the community caused by the prosecutor's inaction. In addition, such reports probably come too late to enable the attorney general to prevent inadequate prosecution or to intervene before a case is terminated. Another method of appraising the local situation would require the attorney enacted by the legislature has not the support of public sentiment, this may be, under some cArcumstances, a reason for its amendment or repeal, but it is not a good defense for a county attorney, upon whose lips is fresh the oath of office, for refusing to attempt its enforcement. general to periodically inspect the operation of the prosecutor's office. Such inspection would be aimed at evaluating the effect of the prosecutor's activities upon local law enforcement. However, the attorneys general frequently lack sufficient personnel and funds to effectively make such investigations.A The fact that both the attorney general and the prosecutor are elected officials may be an additional reason for the reluctance of the attorney general to exercise his authority. The attorney general could control a prosecutor whom he appointed much more effectively than one who has been elected by the local community. Furthermore, the attorney general's control over the local prosecutor may be hampered by political considerations. Frequently the prosecutor is a powerful political figure in his local community and the state administration is hesitant to embarrass him or to incur his wrath. On the other hand, if the prosecutor is of a different political party, there are some indications that the attorney general may use his powers as a political weapon.
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There may also be personal motives and ambitions which influence the attorney general's exercise of his powers. While one can imagine instances where the publicity attendant upon intervention in a highly publicized criminal case would benefit an official's career, an attorney general's political future is probably better served by confining his activities to civil law. Certainly, a politically conscious attorney general might be reluctant to become involved in an investigation of the relationship between organized crime and local political officials. Furthermore, as long as his office remains civil in nature he can avoid responsibility for the performance of law enforcement officers.
0 It is probably factors such as these which have caused at least one attorney general to deny the existence of any criminal authority in his office. 
